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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
The doctrine of "judicial notice" is an exception to the
general rules of evidence. 1 It certainly cannot be laid down
as a general proposition that courts can judicially notice matters of fact.2 But there are many facts which it is not necessary to prove because they are so manifestly evident in relation
to the case at hand that they are judicially noticed by the
court. 3 In such cases the naked facts are of the same probative
force as are other facts of a different nature that have been
proven. Judicial notice is really a species of evidence, and in
stands for the same thing within
effect displaces evidence and
4
the scope of its application.
The full scope of the doctrine includes many limitations
and possibilities and cannot well be covered in a few pages,.
Accordingly, the purpose of the writer is simply to define its
general scope and application, and to notice particularly the
recent decisions in this state on the subject.
According to Bouvier the term "judicial notice" is "a
term used to express the doctrine of the acceptance by a court
for the purposes of the case, of the truth of certain notorious
facts without requiring proof." 5 In United States v. Hammers, et al.6 the rule is stated thus: "judicial notice or knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which
courts may properly take an act upon without proof because7
they already know them." The Kansas court in State v. Kelly
said: "the term 'judicial notice' means no more than that the
court will-bring to its own aid and consider, without proof of
the facts, its knowledge of those matters of public concern which
are known by all well-informed persons." These general definitions are perhaps sufficient for all practical purposes. But a
thorough knowledge of the subject can be obtained only by a
study of specific cases.
1

Greenbaum v. Bingham, 201 N. Y. 343, 94 N. E. 853.
2 United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 8 Law Ed. 640.
3Couin v. San Francisco,99 Cal. 17, 33 Pac. 753, 37 Am. St. Rep. 17.
4State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 Atyl. 80 36 L. R. A. 623.
5
Bouvier's Law Dictionary,Vol. II, p. 1734.
6241 Fed. 542.
71 Itan. 811, 81 Pac. 450.
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The general rule is that courts will take judicial cognizance
of whatever is or ought to be generally known within the limits
of their jurisdiction.8 The general classes of facts which come
within the realm of judicial notice are: judicial, legislative,
political, historical, geographical, commercial, scientific, and
artistic, in addition to a wide range of matters arising in the
ordinary course of nature or the general current of human
affairs which rest entirely upon acknowledged notoriety for their
claims to judicial recognition. 9 Thus in the case of United
States v. La Vengeance' ° the court judicially noticed the geo
graphical position of Sandy Hook. And it may certainly notice
similar facts, as that the Bay of New York, for instance, is
within the ebb and flow of the tide. 1 Also, in the case of the
Steamboat Thomas Jefferson 1 2 the libel claimed wages earned on
a voyage from Shippingport in Kentucky up the Missouri river
and back again to the place of departure. The decisive point
in the case was whether the wages could be considered as
earned in a maritime employment. The court took judicial
notice of the fact that the tide did not ebb and flow within
the range of the voyage.
The Kentucky cases on judicial notice follow the recognized
principles which govern the doctrine in general' 13 It is the
purpose of the writer now to turn to a more particular discussion of the most recent decisions of the Kentucky courts on the
subject with the view of showing the modern trend of legal
thought on the subject in this state.
An interesting phase of the doctrine is presented by the
case of liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Caoperative Association,'4 decided by the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, May 1, 1925. The purpose of the appeal was to test
the constitutionality of a statute enacted Jan. 10, 1922, commonly known as the Bingham Co-operative Marketing Act, providing for tobacco growers' co-operative associations. At this
time there was no statute in this state against pools, trusts and

"Salomon

v. State, 28 Ala. 83.

'Bouvier's Law Dictionary,Vol. II, p. 1734.
lo3 Dall. 297, 1 Law Ed. 610.
Peyrouc v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324, 8 Law Ed. 700.
1210 Wheat. 428, 6 Law Ed. 358.
3Gnau, et al. v. Ackerman, 166 Ky. 258, 179 S. W. 217; Craig v.
Durret, 1 J. . 1W. 365; Baum v. Winston, 3 Met. 127.
14208 Ky. 643, 271 S. W. 695.
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monopolies. The only law against such combinations was the
common law. The question arose as to the power of a legislature to repeal the common law prevailing in the jurisdiction
where it sits or to alter or modify the police power of a state.
No evidence was presented to the court as to the general agricultural conditions prevailing in the state at the time the
Bingham Co-operative Marketing Act was passed, or current
events growing out of such conditions, and the attention of the
court was not called to the fact that similar statutes had been
held valid in other states. But the court said in the opinion:
"We take judicial knowledge of the history of the country and of current events, and from that source we know that
conditions at the time of the enactment of the Bingham Act
were such that the agricultural producer was at the mercy of
speculators and others who fixed the price of the selling producer and the purchasing price of the final consumer through
combinations and other arrangements, whether valid or invalid,
and that by reason thereof the farmer obtained a grossly ina'dequate price for his products. So much so was that the ease
that the intermediate handlers between the producer and the
final consumer injuriously operated upon both classes and fattened and flourished at their expense. It was and is a wellknown fact that without the agricultural producer, society
could not exist, and the oppression brought about in the manner indicated was driving him from his farm, thereby creating
a condition fully justifying an exception in his case from any
provision of the common law, and likewise justifying legislative action in the exercise of its police power.
"Co-operative marketing acts for agricultural products
have been enacted in a great number of the agricultural states,
the provisions of which are similar to and in many instances
the same as are the provisions of the Bingham Act. They are
all intended to accomplish the same ultimate end, and in each
of those states they have been upheld in actions urging the same
constitutional objections as are made here."
Thus it is seen that in this case the court took judicial notice
of the history of the country, current events, economic conditions, and the laws of other states.
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Another Kentucky case which deserves notice at this point
is that of Van Meter, et al. v. Cormmonwealt&,15 decided by the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky June 9, 1925, in which the court
refused to take judicial notice of a fact specifically presented
to it. The defendants were convicted of possessing intoxicating liquor. The indictment charged that the defendants "did
unlawfully 1 ave and keep in their possession spirituous, vinous,
and malt liquors, to-wit, still beer."
The court in this case
said:
"Our statute is directed against the possession of intoxicating liquor. While the indictment accuses appellants of possession of intoxicating liquor, yet, when it comes to describe
the particular circumstances of the offense, it merely charges
that they 'did, unlawfully have and keep in their possession
spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, to-wit, still beer,' without
any allegation that the still beer was intoxicating.
While the courts will take judicial knowledge of the fact that
ordinary, common beer is intoxicating, that rule does not apply
to a particular kind of beer, which may or may not be intoxicating. "
At first consideration this case seems to be rather technical
and to turn on a nice distinction of terms. But the basis of
the decision may be found by examining the Criminal Code.
Under our Code the indictment must be direct and certain as
regards (1) the party charged; (2) the offense charged; (3)
the county in which the offense was committed; (4) the particular circumstances of the offense charged, if they are necessary to constitute a complete offense.' 6 Itis also essential that
an indictment contain a statement of the acts constituting the
offense in ordinary and concise language, and in such manner
as to enable a person of common understanding to know what
is intended; and with such degree of certainty as to enable the
court to pronounce judgment on conviction, according to the
17
right of the case.
Thus it is seen that this case is not properly a limitation
upon the doctrine of judicial notice, but rests squarely upon
the specific provisions of the Code.
-209 Ky. 465, 173 S. W. 36.
"Section 124, Criminal Code.
"Section 122, Criminal Code.
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Another important phase of the doctrine is presented by
the case of Boreing et at. v. Garrard,et a1 8 decided May 19,
1925. This case was an equitable action to quiet title to land.
The difficult question was to determine the location of the beginning point in an old survey described as a point ". . . on
the bank of the west fork of the first creek that empties into
Cumberland river above where the settlement road crosses,
"
The court took judicial knowledge of the history and
geography of the state and noticed that the city of Pineville.
in Bell county, was built on the Cumberland river at a point
where the settlement road crossed that river, saying in part:
"This court takes judicial knowledge of the history and
geography of Kentucky. . . . We conclude from
the facts of the history and geography of our state, of which
we take judicial knowledge, .
The opinion in this case was evidently prepared with great
care and after reference to many maps and records. The points
involved are discussed at great length. But the principles recognized and applied by the court axe laid down with accuracy,
precision and insight. The doctrine of judicial notice as to
historical and geographical facts is couched in terse and emphatic language and the facts therein noticed are given full
probative effect. This is a leading case on the precise facts
involved.
The case of Louisvflle & Nashvile RBailroad Co. v. Birochik,19
decided February 27, 1925, is another important recent case
which presents what seems to be a rather extreme view in the
application of the doctrine of judicial notice. Plaintiff brought
an action for $5,308.43 against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. as damages for the loss of a shipment of household
goods which -he shipped over defendant's lines from Lynch via
Hazard to Mllstone. The court required plaintiff to file a list
of the goods lost, and according to that paper his aggregate
loss was $5,308.43. The goods were packed for shipment in one
barrel, three tubs, two baskets, and a bucket. An itemizedf list
of plaintiff's own personal apparel he claimed to have lost
was: boots and shoes, $119.32; bath robes, $22.05; four suits
of clothes, $437.40; fifteen suits of work clothes, $44.25; two
11210 Ky. 135, 175 S. W. 375.
207 Ky. 595, 269 S. W. 720.
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overcoats, $242.00; hose, $51.40; shirts, $61.25, etc. He claims
his wife lost: three fur coats, $435.00; bath robes, $23.00;
-dresses and skirts, $802.95; shoes, $147.35; and hose, $81.00.
The alleged value of silver knives, forks, spoons, etc., lost was
$161.25, and of pictures of ex-presidents was $267.30. Plaintiff was a miner, and his average monthly wage was $141.13.
He was the sole breadwinner of a family of eight and lived in
three rented rooms. His domestic surroundings and apparent
wealth were similar to those of other miners. The court took
judicial notice of the inconsistency existing between plaintiff's
income and surroundings and the alleged value of the goods lost,
saying in part:
"Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed as appellee
claims this family was, nor did he have any more in his palace
than this appellee claims to have had in his three rooms. If
he can go on the stage and by legerdemain take as many things
out of a tub, basket, or barrel, as he says he put into these, he
has a fortune in his grasp.
"The members of this court are not going to pretend to
be more ignorant than the rest of men, or that matters of common knowledge are not also known to them. We know judicially
that with the war prices of 1920, a coal miner earning $141.13
per month, could not pay his house rent, feed his family of
eight and'array them in any such style as the appellee claims.
This claim is fraudulently extravagant."
IThis case seems to stretch the doctrine of judicial notice
considerably in applying it to the financial status of plaintiff.
It is open to severe criticism on this account. There are many
ways to amass -money other than by the ordinary savings from
a rather meagre monthly income. Probably no other one thing
is more universally varient than one's financial status at different times. This is especially true in the case of miners and
people engaged in similar employments where work is usually
irregular and wages fluctuate.
But there is no. doubt that, on the facts presented, the
decision in this case works complete justice There is undoubtedly a fatal inconsistency between the plaintiff's income and his
extravagant claim. His surroundings and apparent wealth
almost negative any possibility of his having this amount of
money invested in property as extravagant in nature as that
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set out in his own itemized list. If the particular facts in the
case as presented to the court are carefully considered, and the
fatal inconsistency involved therein is given full effect, it seems
that the case is probably right on both legal and ethical principles. The chief objection presented by this conclusion is
the difficulty the courts will meet with in the future in attempting to circumscribe the doctrine of this case within, proper
limits.
Thus it is seen that the doctrine of judicial notice is essentially general in nature. The reason for it is found in common
sense. The universal test of the advisability of applying it in
a particular case is whether the facts involved therein are or
ought to be a matter of common knowledge. The recent Kentucky cases indicate that the modern trend of legal thought on
the subject in this state is sufficiently conservative to be salutary and yet sufficiently liberal to be progressive. These cases
represent the tendency of the courts to perpetuate fundamental
principles liberally interpreted to meet immediate needs.
WooDsoN D. ScoTT.

